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Abstract
In two recent cases, the European Commission raised objections to pro-
posed international mergers on the ground that they would increase the
retaliatory power of the acquiring firm if another firm tried to enter its
market. This paper builds a model of collusion designed to test formally
the theory used by the European Commission in one of these cases, the
Su¨dzucker - Saint Louis Sucre merger. It shows that, contrary to the as-
sertions by the Commission, the merger does not make collusion easier.
An executive summary can be found on the following pages.
Executive Summary
In two recent cases, the European Commission has expressed fears that
international mergers could be used in order to increase the retaliatory
power of a company which tries to keep control over its home market.
In this paper, I examine this theory in the context of the Su¨dzucker/Saint
Louis Sucre merger, which the Commission authorized in 2001, subject to
undertakings.
Su¨dzucker, a German sugar producer, had notified the Commission of
its proposed acquisition of Saint Louis Sucre (SLS), one of the four main
French producers. Despite the fact that there is very little trade across
national boundaries, the Commission feared that the merger would fa-
vor a form of collusion. It argued that the French firms provided poten-
tial competition on the South German market, and therefore prevented
Su¨dzucker to exploit its market power. The acquisition of SLS would en-
able Su¨dzucker to threaten French firms who entered the South German
market with retaliation on their home market.
The decision does not provide a careful analysis of the way in which
this retaliatory power would be used, and no systematic comparison of
the retaliatory power before and after the merger. In this paper, I propose
such an analysis, and show that the conclusions of the Commission are not
supported by standard economic models of collusion.
These economic models function as follows. The analyst first computes
the outcome of competition between the firms, assuming that each one of
them maximizes its own profits and takes the actions of the other firms as
given. Then, she assumes that the firms agree on some collusive outcome,
where they jointly choose to reduce their production in order to increase
the price of the product (the theory is agnostic on whether this agreement
is explicit or implicit). She analyzes the conditions under which the firms
will abide by this agreement. In order to do so, she embeds her basic
model in a dynamic framework, and assumes that period after period the
firms choose the collusive strategy. Typically, this will imply that each firm
will have a short run incentive to increase its production, taking advantage
of the fact that its competitors have reduced their own. However, such an
increase has a long run cost: the “collusive agreement” will collapse and
the firms will return to the competitive outcome in which they all (includ-
ing the “deviating” firm) have lower profits. The agreement is stable if the
short run benefit of this deviation is smaller than the long run cost.
Therefore, whether or not the firms find it profitable to deviate from
the collusive agreement depends crucially on the relative weight that they
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assign to future costs compared to current benefits. When this weight, the
discount factor, is large the firms will not deviate: they value highly the
future costs of the collapse of collusion. On the other hand, when the dis-
count factor is small, firms weigh current profits more, and the collapse
of collusive agreement will be less of a deterrent to deviation. Economists
often use the critical discount factor at which firms are just indifferent be-
tween respecting and not respecting the collusive agreement as a measure
of the vulnerability of a market structure to collusion. The higher this dis-
count factor, the less vulnerable it is.
In order to test the analysis of the Commission, I build a model along
these lines, which attempts to represent some of the most basic element of
the French and South German sugar markets. In this model, there are one
firm in the South German market and four firms in the French market. It
is more expensive for a firm to sell outside of its home market, so that a
French firm finds it more costly to sell sugar on the German market than
on the French market, and the South German firm finds it more costly to
sell on the French market than on its home market. I then compute the
way in which a merger between the South German firm and the French
firm affects the critical discount factor. In all cases, the merger increases this
critical discount factor, and therefore reduces the likelihood of collusion.
In the first part of the paper, I analyze the case which is the most fa-
vorable to the Commission’s thesis. I assume that collusion raises prices,
to the monopoly level, both in the French and the South German mar-
ket. With or without the merger the collusive outcome is the same — the
South German firm enjoys monopoly profits and the French firms share
the market equally. The analysis show that the French firms have greater
incentives to deviate, both with or without the merger. On the other hand,
the cost of deviation is higher without the merger, and hence the merger
increases the critical discount factor: it makes collusion less likely.
The subsequent sections test the robustness of the conclusions to vari-
ous modifications of the model, and show that they continue to hold. First,
I show that if the collusive agreement is simply that French firms are not
to enter the South German market, without any collusion on the French
market, the same general logic holds. Second, I modify the type of com-
petition in the absence of collusion. Whereas the first part of the paper
assumes that there is “Cournot competition”, a rather weak form of com-
petition, in the second part, there is “Bertrand” competition, where profits
are competed away more aggressively. Here again, we find the same con-
clusion: the merger does not favor collusion.
In the decision, the Commission, answering statements by the parties,
states that it did not believe that the enforcement of collusion would be
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conducted through a general price war, but rather through the targeting
of “strategic clients”. The conclusion discusses briefly this answer, stress-
ing that the theory is ill-formed as the concept of strategic client is not a
standard concept in economics, and that the Commission does not provide
details on the identity of these clients, or the special role that they play.
Finally, it should be stressed that this paper is focussed on a discus-
sion of the consequences of international mergers for collusion. It does
not attempt to provide a realistic description of competition in the sugar
industry, or of the role of antitrust enforcement in industries with heavy
government involvement. My own understanding of these issues is very
different from that of the Commission in a number of important dimen-
sions that are not discussed here.
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In two recent cases, the European Commission has argued that an in-
ternational merger would allow the purchasing firm to retaliate against
foreign firms that would enter its home market. First, in 2000, the Commis-
sion received a notification that E´lectricite´ de France wanted to acquire1 a
German electricity producer, EnBW. In its decision2, the Commission ex-
pressed the fear that this acquisition would enable EDF to retaliate more
easily against any German firm that would enter the French electricity
market.
Similarly, in 2001, Su¨dzucker, a German sugar producer, purchased a
French sugar producer Saint-Louis Sucre (SLS). In its decision3, the Com-
mission expressed the fear that the merger would increase the “retaliatory
power” of Su¨dzucker with respect to French firms that would threaten to
enter the South German market.
Neither of these two decisions contain a systematic analysis of the way
in which this retaliatory power would be exercised. In particular, they do
not explain how this power would be used, whether the threats made by
the parties would be credible, or whether this power existed before the
merger. Because this theory of “creation of retaliatory power” is new in
the jurisprudence of the Commission, it would have deserved a thorough
treatment before being used in decisions. The aim of this paper is to show
that it may not be correct.
I will use a model that tries to represent some of the main features of
the Su¨dzucker-SLS case. It provides a better benchmark for discussing this
theory since the creation of retaliatory power played a more important role
in this decision that in the EDF-EnBW case. Also, the type of government
intervention in the sugar market is more stabilized than in the electricity
market, and it is easier to isolate competitive from regulatory concerns.
I find that in my model, the merger does not increase the retaliatory
power of Su¨dzucker. Two forces are at play. Favoring collusion is the fact
that Su¨dzucker is, after the merger, more present on the French market
and hence can impose greater punishment. On the other hand, the merger
increases the profits of the firms at the static equilibrium, and hence de-
1To be more precise, this was an operation in which EDF and OEW, another German
electricity producer, jointly acquired EnBW.
2Case No Comp/M.1853 - EDF/EnBW, Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 Merger Proce-
dure, 07/02/2001; see §§71-72. There were other objections raised to the merger, which
was eventually allowed, on the basis of the remedies offered by the parties.
3Decision by the Commissionof December 2001 on the Declaration of Compatibility of
a Meerger with the Common Market and the EEA Treaties (Matter No. COMP/M.2530 -
Su¨dzucker/Saint Luis Sucre). This merger was also allowed on the basis of undertakings
proposed by the parties.
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creases the threat of punishment. (It should be stressed that in my model
the merger is not profitable, for the same classical reasons first explained
by Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds (1983): the newly merger firm bears
the brunt of output restrictions). This second effect dominates the first.
More precisely the model assumes that, before the merger, there are
four firms in the French market and one firm on the South German mar-
ket. There is a linear demand in both markets, and the size of the South
German market is 40% of the French market. These figures represent a
rough approximation of the data used by the Commission in its decision.
It argued that the German sugar producers had allocated the market be-
tween themselves so as to have regional near-monopolies, Su¨dzucker con-
trolling the South German market. There were four firms in the French
market: SLS, Be´ghin-Say, Sucre Union, Union SDA. From §58 of the de-
cision, in 1999-2000, total French consumption (industrial and household
sugar) was 2,170,000 tons and South German consumption 1,058,000 tons,
48% of French consumption.4
A firm can produce one unit of sugar for its home market at a cost
normalized to 0, and one unit of sugar for the other market at a cost of
t. It is straightforward to compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this
game — the example has been chosen so that at this equilibrium there
are exports both from the French firms to the South German market and
from the South German firm to the French market. To study the ease of
collusion in that market, I assume that the firms play a repeated game,
and I study the following equilibrium: the South German firm does not
sell on the French market and the French firms do not sell on the South
German market; in both markets, the price is the monopoly price (and
the French market is shared equally between the French firms). The ro-
bustness of the equilibrium is measured by the lowest possible discount
factor at which this outcome can be sustained by a fear of reversal to the
static equilibrium. I then assume that the South German firm and one
of the French firms merge, and conduct the same exercise (there are now
left three French firms and one Franco-South German firm). I show that
the minimum discount factor that supports collusion is greater after the
merger: the merger makes collusion more difficult.
This main part of the analysis, presented in sections 1 and 2 is based on
a model of Cournot competition between the firms. This modelling strat-
egy was chosen in order to make the model as close as possible to what
4I disagree with a substantial portion of the analysis of market made by the Commis-
sion. However, the aim of this paper is to discuss the collusion theory and I therefore
start from its characterization of the market to show that the collusion theory does not
follow from the premises.
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seems to be the implicit model of the sugar market of the Commission,
who believes that there are monopolistic rents in the sugar market. I show
that after the merger the maximum discount factor which can support col-
lusion is greater than before the merger, as stated in proposition 1. Collu-
sion is possible in a greater range of circumstances, which proves that the
Commission’s theory is misguided, at least in the case of the sugar market.
The collusive behavior modelled in sections 1 and 2 was chosen to give
the best possible chance to the theory of the Commission, as it assumed
that collusion increased the profits of the French firms to a quarter of the
monopoly profits on the French market. This makes the threat of rever-
sal to the non collusive outcome specially powerful. However, I have not
found evidence of collusive behavior in the French sugar market. There-
fore, in section 3, I examine the stability of a collusive outcome where
the only agreement is that each firm keeps to its national market. Then,
the French firms play a Cournot game. I prove that the merger does not
change the incentives to collude.
In section 4, I revisit the same issues assuming that there is Bertrand
competition, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions to the mod-
elling strategy. Here again, I find that the merger does not facilitate collu-
sion, although the results are slightly weaker than in the case of Cournot
equilibrium: for most values of t the merger has no influence, either posi-
tive or negative, on the possibility of collusion.
In response to the parties, the Commission was a bit more expansive
on its theory in the final decision: in particular it argued that it expected
the punishment by Su¨dzucker would be carried selectively, and focussed
on “strategic customers”. The discussion still falls short of a well formed
theory, and I discuss it in the conclusion.
Collusion is not very well understood by economists, and full mod-
els of optimal collusion are extremely difficult to study. For instance, in
their study of collusion under capacity constraints, Compte, Jenny and
Rey (2001) must make restrictive assumptions on the punishment paths
— i.e., that the market shares along these paths are the same than when
collusion is effective — in order to solve the model. In this paper, I use
a simpler strategy and concentrate on trigger price strtegies, where collu-
sion sustains monopoly pricing and is maintained by the threat of reversal
to the static outcome. A full treatment would be of great interest, but quite
difficult.
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1 No collusion outcomes
1.1 No collusion outcomes without merger
There are two markets, the French market and the South German market.
There are four French firms, firms 1, 2, 3 and 4 and one South German
firm, firm g. The cost of production of each of these firms is normalized
to 0. On the other hand, they incur a cost5 of t per unit when they transport
sugar to the foreign market. We assume t ≤ 1/5, so that all the equilibrium
quantities are strictly positive.
If the quantities sold on the French market are q1, q2, q3, q4 and qg (I will
not distinguish notationally between quantities sold on the French market
and quantities sold on the South German market — the market will be
clear from the context), the price at which firm 1 sells its sugar on that
market is
p1 = 1− q1 − q2 − q3 − q4 − qg.
Its profit on that market is
q1(1− q1 − (q2 + q3 + q4 + qg)).
The profits of firms 2, 3 and 4 are obtained by easy substitution; on the
other hand the profit of firm g reflects the fact that it faces a transportation
cost t, and is equal to
qg(1− t− qg − (q1 + q2 + q3 + q4)).
(Notice that the prices are gross of transportation costs; so that the French
firms and the South German firm charge the same amount on the French
market.)
The South German market is 40% of the French market. Therefore, the
South German firm sells quantity qg at a price
pg = 1− 5
2
(qg + q1 + q2 + q3 + q4),
where q1, q2, q3 and q4 are the quantities sold by the French firms on the
South German market. Its profits on the South German markets are there-
fore
qg
(
1− 5
2
(qg + q1 + q2 + q3 + q4)
)
. (1)
5In its decision, the Commission insists on the fact that the transportation costs of
sugar are very high, but provides no estimate of these costs. The fact that there is very
little inter country trade is not a proof of high transportation cost, as production quotas
are allocated (by the EU) so as to ensure that production is at least equal to consumption
in nearly all member states.
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Because the French firms face transportation costs when selling in the
South German markets, the profits of firm 1 are equal to
q1(1− t− 5
2
(q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 + qg)),
and the profits of firms 2, 3 and 4 are obtained similarly.
Without collusion and merger the equilibrium of the game between the
four firms is easily computed. Because of returns to scale are constant, the
games played in the two markets are independent of each other. Standard
computations show that the equilibrium quantities in the French market
are
q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 =
1
6
+
1
6
t
and6
qg =
1
6
− 5
6
t.
On the South German markets outputs are
q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 =
2
5
(
1
6
− 1
3
t
)
,
qg =
2
5
(
1
6
+
2
3
t
)
.
The comparative statics are interesting. A small increase in t from t = 0
leads to a decrease in the total quantity sold on each of the markets and in
the aggregate production of the South German firm, but to an increase in
the aggregate quantity produced by the French firms. As a consequence,
the profits of each of the French firms (summed over the two markets),
7
180
+
1
90
t+
13
180
t2,
are increasing in t, whereas the profits of the South German firm,
7
180
− 17
90
t +
157
180
t2,
are decreasing in t, for t < 17/157  0.11.
Note that when t = 0, the profits of the South German firm and of
the French firms are the same, because in this case there is fundamentally
only one big integrated market, but for 0 < t ≤ 1/5, the French firms have
larger profits.
6It is in order to ensure that this qg is indeed positive, that we have assumed t ≤ 1/5.
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1.2 No collusion outcomes with merger
We will represent the merger by assuming that the South German firm
buys French firm 4. Because the new firm has two sources of supply, it
will clearly choose to deliver all the quantity that it delivers in France from
firm 4 and all the quantity that it wants to deliver in the South German
market from the South German firm. Apart from this, the markets will
still be independent.
Therefore, in the French markets, we will find ourselves with a classic
Cournot type equilibrium. Firm 1 maximizes
q1(1− q1 − (q2 + q3 + q4))
(I am keeping the notation q4 for the output of the merged firm in the
French market), and the profit of the other firms are obtained by permuta-
tion. The equilibrium is
q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 =
1
5
.
In the South German market, the profits of the South German firm are
the same as in (1), with q4 set equal to 0,
qg(1− 5
2
(qg + q1 + q2 + q3)).
The profits of firm 1 are
q1(1− t− 5
2
(q1 + q2 + q3 + qg)).
The equilibrium is
q1 = q2 = q3 =
2
5
(
1
5
− 2
5
t
)
qg =
2
5
(
1
5
+
3
5
t
)
.
Conceptually straightforward computations make possible a compu-
tation of the benefits of a merger. We find that if t is “small”, mergers are
not profitable. This is not surprising, and the intuition for these types of
results is well understood since, at least, Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds
(1983): the merged firm internalizes the increase in profits stemming from
a decrease in production while the other firms free ride. More precisely, we
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find that if t ≤ . 125 , the merger is not profitable. For larger t, the merger is
profitable; in this framework, this is due to the fact that the presence of the
cost of transportation leads to efficiency gains, as the newly merged firm
can transfer production to the local factories and not carry sugar through
borders.
2 Collusion
We now embed the model of section 1 in a repeated game, where the firms
play the same game in each period. We assume that the discount factor7 is
δ, and, as is standard in the literature, that the punishment for deviating
from the collusive outcome is reversal to the static equilibrium.
In this section, I will only study collusion outcomes with the following
properties:
• French firms only sell in the French market, and share the market
equally,
• The South German firm only sells in the South German market.
• The prices charged in both markets is the monopoly price.
In this way, I represent the fear of the Commission that the South Ger-
man firm will be able to keep the market to itself. Given that all firms are
similar, it is natural to assume that the collusive agreement has the French
firms sharing the market equally.
Let q be the common production, in the French market. It is chosen so
as to maximize q (1− 4q) and we obtain
q = q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 =
1
8
.
In each period, each French firm makes a profit of
1
16
.
On the South German market, only the South German firm produces
qg = 1/5, the monopoly production, and makes a profit of 1/10.
7Remember that this discount factor should be thought as the loss of value of the
numeraire over a period equal to the time it takes to spot a deviation from the collusive
equilibrium.
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2.1 Collusion without merger
2.1.1 Incentives of French firms
If they respect the collusion agreement, the French firms obtain a dis-
counted profit equal to
(
1 + δ + δ2 + . . .
)× 1
16
=
1
1− δ
1
16
.
Let us look at the incentives to deviate for firm 1 (obviously, the incen-
tives will be the same for firms 2, 3 and 4). If it deviates from the collusion
agreement, it will choose a production on the French market and a pro-
duction on the South German market that will maximize its profits. On
the French market it will choose a q1 that maximizes
q1(1− q1 − (q2 + q3 + q4))
with q2, q3 and q4 all equal to 1/8. This yields q1 = 5/16, and profits on
the French market equal to 25/256. On the South German market, firm 1
chooses q1 to maximize
q1(1− t− 5
2
(q1 + qg))
with qg = 1/5. This yields
q1 =
2
5
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)
and profits equal to
2
5
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
.
If it deviates, firm 1 obtains profits equal to the sum of the first pe-
riod profits from deviating and the discounted value of the non collusion
outcome from the next period onwards. This is equal to
25
256
+
2
5
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
δ
1− δ
(
7
180
+
1
90
t +
13
180
t2
)
. (2)
This is larger than the payoff from keeping to the collusive path, i.e.
1
1− δ
1
16
,
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0.72
0.71
0.70
0 0.1 0.2
No Collusion
Collusion
t
δ
Figure 1: This figure represents, as a function of t, the variation of the
smallest value of δ for which the French firms would respect the collusive
agreement in the absence of merger, in the Cournot model of section 2.1.1.
if and only if δ is smaller than the solution to the equation
(1152− 320δ) t2 + (−1152 + 1280δ) t+ 693− 965δ = 0,
i.e., if
δ <
9
5
128t2 − 128t+ 77
64t2 − 256t+ 193 .
The right hand side of this inequality is graphed on figure 1.
2.1.2 Incentives of the South German firm
The South German firm gains less than the French firms from deviating.
Indeed, by not deviating it obtains profits of
1
1− δ ×
2
5
× 1
4
=
1
10(1− δ) .
If it deviates, it sells on the French market qg chosen to maximize
qg
(
1− qg − t− 4× 1
8
)
= qg
(
1
2
− qg − t
)
,
which yields qg = 1/4− t/2 and profits equal to (1/4− t/2)2.
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Of course, it does not change its output on the South German market.
Therefore, in the period in which it deviates it makes profits of
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
1
10
.
Its total discounted profits if it deviates from the collusion path are there-
fore (
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
1
10
+
δ
1− δ
(
7
180
− 17
90
t+
157
180
t2
)
and the benefits it gets from deviating are equal to
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
1
10
+
δ
1− δ
(
7
180
− 17
90
t +
157
180
t2
)
− 1
1− δ ×
1
10
.
This is positive if
δ ≤ 45 1− 4t+ 4t
2
89− 44t− 448t2 .
The right hand side of this expression is represented on figure 2. Com-
paring this figure with figure 1, we see that the cutoff δ is smaller than for
the French firms. Hence, whenever the South German firm has incentives
to deviate, so do the French firms. We summarize this in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 In the collusion model without merger, the binding incentive con-
straints are those of the French firms.
2.2 Collusion with merger
In the collusion outcome after the merger, the productions will be the same
in both markets, and, along the collusive path, the profits of firms 1, 2
and 3 are the same than without merger whereas the profits of the South
German firm are simply the sum of the profits of firm 4 and firm g before
the merger.
2.2.1 Incentives of French firms
The French firms (i.e., firms 1, 2 and 3) make the same collusion profits
after the merger than before the merger. Furthermore, because the pro-
ductions are the same with or without the merger, in the period in which
10
0.50
0.40
0.30
0 0.1 0.2
t
δ
No Collusion
Collusion
Figure 2: This figure represents, as a function of t, the variation of the
smallest value of δ for which the South German firm would respect the
collusive agreement in the absence of merger, in the Cournot model of
section 2.1.
they would deviate, they would choose the same production as in the ab-
sence of merger. On the other hand, the reversal to the non collusive path
is less costly (the French firms earn more with the merger) and therefore
the incentives to cheat are higher.
More precisely, the gains from deviating are equal to
157
1280
− 1
10
t+
1
10
t2 +
δ
1− δ
(
7
125
− 8
125
t +
8
125
t2
)
− 1
1− δ
1
16
,
and we find that this is positive if δ is less than the value represented on
figure 3.
2.2.2 Incentives of the South German firm
If it decided to deviate from the collusive outcome, the South German firm
would keep its production constant in the South German market, and ex-
pand its production in the French market. Hence, its gains from the devi-
ation would be exactly the same as those of the French firms. On the other
hand, it would find the reversal to the non-collusive outcome more costly:
the same amount on the French market, but there would also be losses
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0.90
0.80
0.73
0 0.1 0.2
t
δ
No Collusion
Collusion
Figure 3: This figure represents, as a function of t, the variation of the
smallest value of δ for which the French firms would respect the collusive
agreement after the merger, in the Cournot model of section 2.2.
on the South German market. Therefore, we have proved the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 In the collusion model with merger, the binding incentive constraints
are those of the French firms.
2.3 Comparing collusion with and without merger
Comparing the preceding results, we obtain immediately the following
proposition, which proves that the Commission’s theory does not stand.
Proposition 1 For all δ for which the collusive outcome is stable with the merger,
it is also stable without the merger.
Therefore the merger does not facilitate collusion, and actually can make
it more difficult.
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3 The consequences of competition in the French
market
Up to this point, I have assumed that the collusive outcome yielded the
monopoly price in the French market. Although in its decision the Com-
mission seems to believe that there is evidence of excessive margins in
the French sugar industry, I certainly do not find the analysis conclusive.8
First, a comparison of costs and prices show them to be are in line with
each other. Second, the structure of the market is not conducive to collu-
sion. The purchasing side is very concentrated (a few large firms for in-
dustrial grade sugar, a very few large retailers for household sugar); each
of the clients organize its own reverse English auction where it does not
communicate the identity of the competitors and the price they offer. The
quantity that the clients buy from each potential supplier varies consider-
ably from year to year.
Under these conditions, it is of some interest to study the following
scenario: collusion is limited to the fact that no firm enters the foreign
market. I show that the same result as in the previous section holds: the
merger does not favor collusion.
The no collusion outcomes with or without merger are the same as
above.
Without merger collusion yields monopoly profits for the South Ger-
man firm and Cournot9 profits for the French firms: each of them produces
1/5 and the price is equal to 1/5. The per period profits of a French firm
are 1/25.
If the South German firm deviates, in the French market it produces
qg so as to maximize qg(1/5 − t − qg), i.e., 1/10 − t/2, and obtains profits
of (1/10− t/2)2. It finds it worthwhile to deviate if
1
10
+ (1/10− t/2)2 + δ
1− δ
(
7
180
− 17
90
t+
157
180
t2
)
>
1
10(1− δ) ,
which is equivalent to
δ <
9
16
1− 10t+ 25t2
4 + 5t− 35t2 .
8Clearly the price of beets is above the competitive price. My statement refers to the
profits of the sugar companies, given the price of beets which is set by the Commission.
9As should be clear from the discussion that precedes, I believe that the actual type of
competition in the French sugar market is more akin to Bertrand than to Cournot compe-
tition. I will study Bertrand competition in the next section.
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If French firms deviate, they obtain the same profits as in section 2.1.1,
except for the fact that their first period profits in the French market will be
smaller (they have no incentives to change their production on the French
market). Modifying (2) appropriately, we obtain
1/25 +
2
5
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
δ
1− δ
(
7
180
+
1
90
t+
13
180
t2
)
.
It is worthwhile to deviate if
1/25 +
2
5
(
1
4
− 1
2
t
)2
+
δ
1− δ
(
7
180
+
1
90
t+
13
180
t2
)
>
1
(1− δ)25 ,
which is equivalent to
δ <
45 (1− 2t)2
(47− 200t+ 50t2) .
It is easy to check numerically that the French firms have more incen-
tive to deviate, as is intuitively obvious: they can enter the South German
market where prices are high, whereas the South German firm gains much
less by entering the French market where the firms in place are already
producing substantial amounts. Actually, when t >
(
3
√
10− 5) /65 
0.07, the French firms are better off in the no-collusion outcome than in
the collusion outcome: they loose more by being barred from the South
German market than they gain by not having the competition of the South
German firm on their home market. Under these conditions, collusion is
not sustainable whatever δ.
It is easy to prove that the merger makes collusion more difficult. It
does not affect the collusive outcome. The merged firm has no incentives
to deviate from the collusive path, as its production in both markets is
already a best response to its competitors. For the French firms, the rea-
soning of 2.2.1 still applies. Their profits on the collusive path are the same
with or without the merger, and the reversal to the non collusive path is
less costly without the merger. The incentives to cheat are higher.
4 Collusion with Bertrand equilibrium
In this section, I discuss collusion when, in the static equilibrium, the firms
play a Bertrand game rather than a Cournot game.
Without collusion, with or without the merger, if the firms play a Ber-
trand game, the price will be equal to 0 on the French market, and to t on
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the South German market, with all South German consumers buying from
the South German firm. The French firms make no profit, while the South
German firm has profits equal to t × 2(1− t)/5. Because all prices are the
same with or without the merger, it neither increases nor decreases profits
in the absence of collusion.
We will use two different scenarios to study collusion:
• scenario A uses a modelling of collusion similar to that of section 2:
the firms coordinate on both markets to impose the monopoly price;
• scenario B uses a modelling of collusion similar to that of section 3:
the South German firm maintains the monopoly price in the South
German market, and tries to use its ownership of French firm 4 in
order to prevent entry by the other French firms. In that scenario,
the only profits that are increased by collusion are those of the South
German firm.
4.1 Scenario A
In scenario A, with collusion, the price is equal to 1/2 in both markets;
assuming that they share the market equally, the profits of each of the four
French firms are equal to 1/16 (they each sell 1/8 at price 1/2). The profits
of the South German firm are equal to 1/10 (it sells 1/5 at price 1/2).
If it deviates from the collusive path, a French firm will do so by low-
ering its price to slightly below 1/2 on both the French and South German
markets; it will then sell 1/2 on the French market and 1/5 on the South
German market, and obtain profits equal to
1/2× 1/2 + (1/2− t)× 1/5 = 7/20− t/5.
After reversion to the static equilibrium, its profits will be equal to 0 in all
subsequent periods. The deviation is profitable if and only if
7/20− t/5 ≥ 1
1− δ
1
16
⇐⇒ δ ≤ 23− 16t
28− 16t. (3)
For the South German firm, the best deviation from the collusive path
is to charge slightly below 1/2 on the French market, while maintaining its
price of 1/2 on the South German market. In the period where it deviates,
is profits will be equal to
1/2× (1/2− t) + 1/2× 1/5 = 7/20− t/2.
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Figure 4: This graph represents the cutoff δ for collusion in Scenario A
without merger as a function of t. The downard sloping dashed curve
represents the cutoff δ for the French firms: they will respect the collusive
agreement only if δ is above that curve. Similarly, the South German firm
will respect the collusive agreement only if δ is above the upward sloping
solid curve. The collusive agreement is therefore stable only if δ is above
both curves.
After the breakdown of collusion, it will make per period profits equal to
t × 2/5 × (1 − t). Hence, deviating from the collusive path is profitable if
and only if
7/20− t/2 + δ
1− δ ×
2t(1− t)
5
≥ 1
1− δ
1
10
⇐⇒ δ ≤ 5
7− 4t .
Plotting these two limits, we obtain figure 4. As explained in its cap-
tion, the collusive agreement is stable only if δ is above both curves. We
see that the incentives of the French firms to deviate are the binding con-
straint, except if t is very large, superior to 3/16 = 0.1875, that is over 35%
of the monopoly price. If t is superior to this limit, only the incentives of
the South German firm are binding
With the merger, the incentives of the French firms to deviate are the
same as without the merger, as they can make the same profits through
their deviation, and the “punishment” is the same. If it deviates, the South
German firm will charge a price of 1/2 in both markets, and serve each
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Figure 5: This graph represents the cutoff δ for collusion in Scenario A
with the merger as a function of t. The downard sloping dashed curve
represents the cutoff δ for the French firms: they will respect the collusive
agreement only if δ is above that curve. Similarly, the South German firm
will respect the collusive agreement only if δ is above the upward sloping
dotted curve. The collusive agreement is therefore stable only if δ is above
both curves.
market through its local subsidiary. Its profits in that period will therefore
be equal to 1/4 + 1/10. The deviation will be profitable if and only if
1/4 + 1/10 +
δ
1− δ
(
1
16
+
2t(1− t)
5
)
≥ 1
1− δ
(
1
10
+
1
16
)
⇐⇒ δ ≤ 15
23− 32t+ 32t2 .
On figure 5, I have plotted the right hand side of this expression and
the right hand side of (3). The collusive agreement will be respected only
if δ is above both curves. We see that the incentives of the French firms to
deviate are the binding constraint if δ is smaller than 0.161.
In order to study the effect of the merger on the incentives to deviate
from the collusive path, without going through uninteresting computa-
tions, I have superimposed in figure 6 the curves of figures 4 and 5. We
see that, if anything, the merger never makes collusion easier. For the
most relevant values of t, the binding constraint is the incentives of French
firms, and is the same with and without the merger. For larger values of t,
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Figure 6: On this figure, we have superimposed the curves of figures 4 and
5. This shows that if collusion is feasible with the merger, it is also feasible
without the merger, but that the opposite is not true for large enough t.
the binding constraint is the incentives of the South German firm, and the
merger makes collusion more difficult.
4.2 Scenario B
Scenario B does not lead to a very interesting analysis, but I have included
it because it may be closer in spirit to what the Commission had in mind
in its decision: the South German firm is using its ownership of firm 4
in order to protect its monopoly on the South German market. However,
the merger does not help the South German firm. Indeed, because there
is Bertrand competition in the French market with or without collusion,
French firms always have profits equal to 0, and they cannot be punished
for entering the South German market.
In order to obtain a model that would indeed yield stable collusion
with merger and no collusion without the merger, we would have to as-
sume that there were only two French firms before the merger. Then,
the newly merged firm could increase its price in the French market, and
therefore give some profits to its French competitor, which would provide
room for punishment in case of entry on the South German market. How-
ever, if this is possible, it is difficult to understand in this case why the
French firms would not be able to collude even in the absence of merger
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(and in the sugar market, there were more than two firms in France before
the merger!).
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that some cross-border mergers cannot be explained
by the desire to acquire or strengthen retaliatory power, at least if we use
the standard collusion models used by economists. From the decision,
it seems that Su¨dzucker presented objections to the Commission’s theory
consistent with the theory developed above:
“In its Response to the points of complaint from the Com-
mission, Su¨dzucker argues that any retaliatory measures would
be counterproductive for the group after the concentration, since
they would lower the price level in France for the future sub-
sidiary SLS and thus would harm the group. Rather, (it ar-
gues,) after the concentration Su¨dzucker would necessarily be
interested in avoiding such retaliation, because the results of it
would affect it too, through SLS.”10
The Commission’s reply is somewhat surprising:
“For one, it was not to be anticipated anyway that the par-
ties would get themselves into a general price war that would
damage business for all sides. For another, a general drop in
the price level in France is also not to be expected for the reason
that such retaliatory measures by nature are carried out selec-
tively with respect to individual customers of the competitor, in
order to attack the competitor in a targeted manner. Since, un-
less they have a market-dominating position, sugar manufac-
turers do not by any means have to offer their customers equal
terms for equal service, targeted low-price offers for individual
strategic customers of the competitors are easily possible and
are also common in the industry.”11
This is a puzzling statement, and beyond the reach of economic anal-
ysis, as the notion of “strategic customers” is not a standard concept in
economic analysis, and is not defined by the Commission, who does not
10Decision, §129.
11Decision, §130.
19
even provide an example of a client it would consider strategic, or explain
the tests that one should use in order to recognize them. It is specially
puzzling in the context of the sugar industry, where the purchasing side
of the market is extremely concentrated. It would seem that either there
are no strategic clients, or that they all are!
The Commission seems to imply that by targeting these strategic cli-
ents, Su¨dzucker-SLS would be able to decrease the profits of its competi-
tor(s) while not suffering from a general decrease in price on the French
market. I believe this is wrong. First, the punishment that can be im-
posed on the competitors is limited by their access to the export market at
prices guaranteed by the Commission itself. Second, even if we assume
away this possibility and Su¨dzucker-SLS decided to increase its sales to
one client, the targeted competitor would increase its sales to the other
customers; this would put competitive pressure on SLS who would be
forced to decrease its prices. The theory of the Commission seems to re-
quire each customer to be an independent market, which is clearly not the
case.
More fundamentally, there is an interesting fundamental issue of the
possibility of collusion in a market with the type of price support that the
European sugar industry enjoys. It purchases its main raw material (beets)
at regulated price. Through a mechanism that guarantees the price of ex-
ports, the Commission fixes the price of the lowest quality sugar. The only
collusion that could occur would be on the amount of transformation of
sugar into higher quality sugar, which seems very difficult given the lack
of transparency of this part of the market.12 Seen from another angle, the
Commission fixes the total weight of sugar sold on the European market,
which does reduce the possibility of collusion!
Of course the treatment of collusion in this paper is very simplified,
and well short of a complete treatment. In particular, I have not com-
puted the optimal punishment paths before and after the merger, but I do
not know how to do it (very few optimal punishment paths have been
computed in the literature). I see no reason why this would change the
results. I have also not tried to “rescue” the Commission’s theory of tar-
12Genevose and Mullin (2001) present a fascinating discussion of the organisation of
collusion in the US sugar industry between 1927 and 1936, through the “Sugar Insti-
tute”. It shows a very sophisticated organization which improved the transparency of
the market to ensure that deviants from any collusive paths could be readily indentified.
My understanding of the way in which the French market functions is that there is very
little public information about the actual transactions between sugar producers and cus-
tomers, and hence that, as opposed to what happened in the US, it would be very difficult
to identify and punish deviations.
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geting of “strategic clients” by providing a more precise definition (but
I do not think this is feasible). My point has simply been to show that
the Commission’s theory does not pass the test of the standard textbook
model that I believe most economists would think is natural to study the
issue. I do believe that the parties (and the general public, including firms
that prepare mergers) are entitled to a fuller explanation of the reasoning
behind the decisions in this and similar cases.
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